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The ethical issues behind the management of a fetus with a serious abnormality and the decisions made in relation to the outcome
of the pregnancy are complex. This reﬂective paper deals with the ethical principles of managing a pregnancy with a congenital
anomaly, with particular emphasis on the fetus with a serious cardiac abnormality. One major ethical concern is whether the fetus
is or is not independent being to whom obligations of beneﬁcence are owed. We review the debate on this matter, and suggest
that it is ethically more appropriate for physicians who are involved in management of fetal abnormality not to adopt and insist
on their own position on this matter. Rather, the appropriate course is to respect the pregnant woman’s own view of her fetus
and how it should be regarded. This is an application of the principle of respect for autonomy. Within this framework, we discuss
the diﬃculties in counselling a pregnant woman or expectant couple in this situation, and recommend three key steps in ethically
sound counselling.
1.Introduction
Prenatal diagnostic ultrasound is widely performed espe-
ciallyinthewesternworld.Parentsattending ascanexpectto
be told that their baby is normal. They want to be reassured
regarding the size and well-being of the infant, and may wish
to know its sex [1]. When a possible anomaly is identiﬁed,
it comes as a shock to the parents, who were not expecting
such an outcome. If the anomaly is subsequently conﬁrmed,
there may be an assumption that as the parents sought
screening in the ﬁrst place; they intended to proceed to an
abortion [2]. However, this is not always the case, given
their expectations at the outset. Counseling the parents in
such situations is complex and requires much sensitivity.
This paper reviews the ethical issues involved and makes
recommendations for practice.
2.BasicEthicalPrinciples
Chervenak et al. have very eloquently described the basic
ethical principles in the management of pregnancies com-
plicated by fetal anomalies [3]. The ﬁrst ethical concept is
that of beneﬁcence. Health related interests of the patient
obligate the physician to seek clinical beneﬁts over clinical
harms for the patient. The second basic ethical principle is
respect for the patient’s autonomy. This principle means that
the patient’s perspective on health-related and other interests
is paramount. The physician needs to respect the patient’s
own set of values, beliefs and decision-making capacity. The
physician’s role is to provide adequate information and a
recommended management plan, or range of possible plans,
for the condition in question. It is vital that the information
isprovidedinamannerthatallowsthepatienttounderstand
it, so as to be able to reach an informed and voluntary
decision. We willdiscuss the physician’s ethical obligations in
relation to informed consent in more detail below. However,
it is important to note that the expectant parents’ great state
of distress, grief or shock may make it very diﬃcult for them
to take in, understand and assimilate what is provided [4],
even with very careful presentation of information.
The crucial ethical question in pregnancies complicated
by fetal anomalies, according to Chervenak et al. [3], is
whether the fetus counts independently as a patient to whom
the obligations of beneﬁcence are also owed (in addition2 International Journal of Pediatrics
to the pregnant woman). If the fetus is also a patient, then
the ethical situation becomes much more complex. What is
best for the pregnant woman may diﬀer from what is best
for the fetus (for example, where there are physical risks
to the woman in continuing the pregnancy). In addition,
the woman may make decisions which are contrary to the
best interests of the fetus (for example to terminate a viable
pregnancy). Diﬃcult choices may have to be made and are
based on where ethical priorities lie.
There are two possible approaches to dealing with the
questionofwhetherthefetusshouldberegardedasapatient.
The ﬁrst approach is that the physician comes to his or
her own moral decision about whether the fetus should
be regarded as a patient. This approach would require the
physician to have a clear and sound moral or philosophical
basis on which to make this decision. The second approach
is that the physician adopts no view and leaves it up to the
pregnant woman (and her partner, if involved) to decide
how they wish to regard their fetus. This approach need
not involve any moral or philosophical reasoning by the
physician about the fetus; simply giving primacy to the
pregnant woman’s autonomy in relation to decisions relating
to her fetus.
Chervenak et al. [3] suggest a variation of the ﬁrst
approach. They concede, as many others do [1, 5], that the
fetus cannot meaningfully possess values and beliefs, and is
therefore not a person to whom obligations can be owed.
However,theymaintainthattheobligationsofbeneﬁcenceto
the fetus arise from the fact that obligations are owed to the
infant which that fetus will become after birth. This makes
the fetus a patient, regardless of whether it is a person. More
speciﬁcally, Chervenak et al. argue that the fetus becomes
a patient only after viability; the pre-viable fetus does not
have the status of a patient, and should only be treated as
a patient if the pregnant woman wants to regard it as such.
Once a fetus is viable (a state related to the biological stage of
development aided by the availability of medical technology)
it is possible for the fetus to survive independently outside
the womb. Hence, according to Chervenak et al., there
are beneﬁcence obligations to the viable fetus, whenever
it is presented to the physician and there exist medical
interventions(whetherdiagnosticortherapeutic)thatcould.
produce a greater balance of clinical good over clinical harm
for it in the future that is, when it becomes an infant, a child
or an adult. There is extensive data to support the possibility
of clinical beneﬁt in cases of cardiac anomalies [6–8].
If this argument is accepted, it means that the physician
may end up having an obligation to seek to change or
override pregnant woman’s wishes, for the sake of the fetus.
If the physician believes the fetus is a patient, owed the same
obligations as any other patient, then his or her obligation
is directed to the best interests of the fetus. If the pregnant
woman’s decisions are contrary to the best interests of the
child that the fetus will become, then the physician has an
obligation to protect those interests, just as for any child
put at risk by parental decisions about medical treatment.
The logic of Chervenak and his co-authors’ position implies
that if attempts at persuasion do not work, the physician
may have to seek legal avenues to override the woman’s
decision, a course of action that could lead to court-enforced
fetal surgery [9], immediate delivery of the fetus and, in
theory, court-ordered continuation of pregnancy (although
it should be noted that in situations where the local laws
permit abortion, they do not generally allow for a third party
to prevent a woman having an abortion).
However, we caution against this approach, where the
physician adopts an independent moral stance on the fetus,
and seeks to act accordingly. Whilst the arguments of
Chervenak et al. [3] are well reasoned, there are also well-
reasoned arguments to the opposite eﬀect, namely that the
fetus should not at any stage of gestation be regarded as a
patient to whom the physician has direct obligations, unless
the pregnant woman chooses to do so. The obligation to the
fetus, as Chervenak et al. acknowledge, is based on the well-
being of the child it will become. However, whether or not
the fetus becomes a child depends on the woman continuing
with her pregnancy. It could be argued that if she decides
to terminate her pregnancy, at any stage and for whatever
reason, there is no longer any obligation to the fetus, since
there will not be any child. This conclusion is contrary to the
view of Chervenak et al., yet draws on the same reasoning
they do.
The well-known diﬀerence in views about the status
of the fetus and the morality of abortion, across diﬀerent
cultures and religions also introduces a note of caution. A
physician working in the multi-cultural setting of today’s
increasingly globalised world is likely to encounter patients
withquitevaried views.In addition, lawsrelating toabortion
vary considerably between jurisdictions. We suggest, then,
that the second approach suggested above is preferable,
namely for the physician to leave it to the pregnant woman
(and partner) to decide if the fetus is to be regarded as a
patient or not (providing that local laws permit abortion).
Adopting that view does not mean that the physician
should not have a personal position on the status of the
fetus, only that he or she should not attempt to impose
it on his or her patients. If the wishes of the pregnant
woman in regards to termination of her pregnancy or intra-
uterine therapy for her fetus are signiﬁcantly at odds with
the physician’s moral views, the physician should exercise the
right to conscientious objection, and hand over the care of
the patient to another doctor [10]. This obligation to refer
is a standardly accepted caveat on the right to conscientious
objection [11]. The Australian Medical Association Code of
Ethics [12], for example, states the following:
When a personal moral judgement or religious belief
alone prevents you from recommending some form of
therapy, inform your patient so that they may seek care
elsewhere, and recognise your right to refuse to carry out
services which you consider to be professionally unethical,
against your moral convictions, imposed on you for either
administrative reasons or for ﬁnancial gain or which you
consider are not in the best interest of the patient.
This position is an attempt to negotiate between compet-
ing moral values: the woman’s autonomy and the physician’s
integrity. The physician is not forced to do something he or
she believes morally wrong, but the woman is also able to
exercise her own choice.International Journal of Pediatrics 3
3.EthicalResponsibilityof Cardiologists When
a SeriousFetal CardiacAnomaly Is Found
Physicians working in obstetrics and gynaecology are pre-
sumably aware of the need to work through these issues
of the status of the fetus, and to develop their position
on abortion, as these issues form a major aspect of their
practice. Paediatric cardiologists, on the other hand, have
had little cause to consider such issues when working in their
discipline, and may never need to do so. However, since it
is now possible to detect fetal cardiac anomalies prenatally,
cardiologists are coming face to face with these issues. There
is usually (in most jurisdictions) an option to terminate an
aﬀected pregnancy and increasingly intrauterine interven-
tions may be possible. Cardiologists must consider how they
will counsel women in these situations, how directive they
will be about which option should be chosen, and what they
will do if the woman’s choice is not the one that optimizes
life and health for the fetus.
Here, we set out the key steps in the counseling process
from an ethical perspective, and make recommendations
about ethically appropriate practice. These steps may take
place over more than one consultation, and may need to be
re-visited on each occasion, due to the emotional nature of
the situation and the complexity of the information to be
conveyed.
3.1. Step 1. Give Accurate Information about the Diagnosis
and Prognosis of the Cardiac Abnormality. The ﬁrst stage
is providing accurate information about the diagnosis and
prognosis in a manner and at a timing that the expectant
parents are able to understand. Fetal cardiac anomalies like
any congenital anomaly necessitate that physicians provide
the parent adequate information. For any counselling to
be credible the diagnosis must be accurate. This is even
more relevant in the case of antenatally diagnosed cardiac
anomalies. The general screening detection rates for con-
genital heart disease (CHD) vary between 14%–45% [13].
A standard 4 chamber view can detect 40%–50% of major
CHD [14], while a 4 chamber view and outﬂow tract detects
70%–80% of major CHD [15]. In dedicated fetal cardiac
centres the diagnostic accuracy is close to 100% [4, 16].
Fetalcardiacmalformationsarecompoundedbythefactthat
other malformations may be present, as is the possibility of
chromosomal abnormalities. The most accurate information
possible should be given to the expectant parents, along
with a clear explanation of what is still uncertain, unclear or
subject to change as the pregnancy progresses. The physician
should keep in mind the possibility of evolving lesions [10]
(e.g.,adevelopingleftandrighthypoplasticheartsyndrome)
and inform the parents accordingly. For such condition,
thereisinadequateorincompletedataasfarastheiroutcome
and natural history, and this also must be conveyed to the
parents.
Shinebourne argues that most CHD are treatable with
a resultant reasonable quality of life [5]. Even in serious
cardiacconditions,oneisnotalwaysabletoclearlydeﬁnethe
possible outcomes. Few cardiac conditions are not amenable
to at least palliative surgery, if not complete repair. In most
cases the neurological development is normal or close to
normal [17]. When dealing with fetal anomalies detected
on ultrasound, the questions and concerns raised by parents
relate to the quality of life issues starting from infancy
right up to adulthood [18]. Generally the details of the
abnormality, while important, are not the paramount issue
for the parents [19]. Complications of the abnormality and
the results of surgery or any intervention also ﬁgure in the
considerations. There is the need to describe possible poor
outcomes, especially if they are severe even though unlikely
tohappen.Thisinformationallowstheparentstodecidehow
to proceed with knowledge of the worst case scenario [10].
The physician needs to ensure the expectant parents
understandtheinformationaboutthenatureofabnormality,
the implications for the life of the future child, the possibility
of intervention, and the risk for each intervention prenatally
or postnatally. Parents also need to know the ﬁgures for
local practice, for short, medium and long term outcomes,
especially with respect to quality of life issues. The physician
must be ready to discuss all of these issues with parents,
providing the best available information, but also indicating
the limits and uncertainties in this information and at a time
when the parents are able to take in the information.
3.2. Step 2. Identify Options. The next stage is to identify
and present the options available. In brief, there are three
main options: to continue with the pregnancy, to terminate
the pregnancy (if legally permitted), or to consider prenatal
intervention (if it is possible for the condition and available).
If the decision is to continue with the pregnancy, there
will perhaps be further decisions to make as to where the
infant is to be delivered, the need for in utero transfer,
and the mode of delivery [19]. There will also need to be
an anticipatory management plan for the infant after birth.
Parents will generally accept what is recommended to them
on these matters, but still require them to be explicitly stated.
If the decision is to terminate, there may be a need to shift
hospitals(fromexamplefromaCatholichospital),orchange
the obstetrician if termination is not personally acceptable
to him or her. The parents should be made aware of these
implications, not in an attempt to change their mind, but to
inform and prepare them for the process.
Local laws and practices play an important role in the
decision making. For example in some places it may be
legal to terminate a pregnancy for maternal psychosocial
reasons [17]; in other places, fetal indications may be
speciﬁed in the law. There may or may not be restrictions
on termination related to the stage of gestation. Broadly
speaking, obstetricians are able to carry out a termination
before 12 weeks [20], but the risk of legal complications
increases after 12 weeks and especially after 20 weeks (which
is about the stage at which antenatal diagnoses of cardiac
anomalies are more commonly made.) In our state of
Victoria, in Australia, the law has recently changed to allow
termination for any reason up until 24 weeks, and after that
there is the need for two doctors to agree that it is reasonable.
Physicians must develop an accurate understanding of their
local laws and seek legal clariﬁcation if necessary.4 International Journal of Pediatrics
Duringthecounselling,assuminga“neutral”toneonthe
part of the clinician—not overly pessimistic or optimistic—
is vital [2] but may be extremely diﬃcult to achieve. The
ultimate aim is to allow the expectant parents to form their
own assessment of the impact the condition would have
on their future child. As Shinebourne [5] notes: “It is the
mother’s perception of the fetal cardiac anomaly and not the
cardiologist’s that should determine outcome (continuation
or termination)”. It is open to question, though, how
achievable this is in a setting of acute emotional distress
where the mother is in a state of shock and grieving the loss
of a sought-after normal infant [4]. The ethical obligation is
to do one’s best to achieve this aim.
3.3. Step 3. Discuss Options. The next stage is discussing the
options with parents which is the most ethically contentious
stage. There are diﬀerent views even about which matters
are ethically appropriate to raise and discuss, let alone about
the degree to which it is appropriate to recommend or
favour a particular option, rather than being as neutral as
possible. Most professionals advocate non-directive [4, 5, 21]
counselling if possible. It is important to realize that the
impact of counseling is aﬀected by the physician’s approach,
speech, tone, and so forth [5]. In many counseling sessions,
selective information is provided, whether deliberately and
inadvertently, though some feel obligated to provide all the
information available. There is also the question as to who
is the best person to do the counseling. Cardiologists, genetic
counsellorsorobstetricianshavecounseledindependentlyor
together [4].
Making a decision may not be easy for the parents. They
have to come to terms with the abnormality and grieve the
loss of a normal infant, as well as grapple with the questions
of what they think about abortion, disability, their personal
capacitytocareforsuchaninfant/childandtheirideasabout
parenthood and family life. They may wish to talk through
the options. They may want their cardiologist’s opinion
about what they should do. Simply giving such an opinion
may not be the best option as the personal circumstances of
the clinician diﬀer from that of the parents. It is preferable to
discuss how one might decide, what factors one would take
into account, in order to model to the expectant parents a
wayofthinking about the issue,ratherthansimply give them
an answer.
The reasons for considering termination may be very
variable, complicated and as Shaﬀer et al. [22] acknowledge,
may not necessarily be “rational” in the strictest sense. This
can make the discussion of options diﬃcult, especially for
thosenotspeciﬁcallytrainedforthesesituations.Thereasons
for which women decide to terminate aﬀected pregnancies
are not well documented or understood, though the few
studies done in the area indicate it is the nature of condition
rather than the stage of gestation that carries most weight
[23]. A common understanding of physicians is that most
terminations for fetal cardiac anomaly are done to minimize
distress and grief to the parents of having a child with
reduced physical activity who may die young. This allows
mother time for other important aspects of her life, care of
the other children and to prevent hardship to others [5].
There may be also be other social reasons, or a medical
condition of the pregnant woman.
Note that in these discussions, the pregnant woman (and
partner) is not necessarily thinking of the the fetus as a
baby, or being with independent rights. Ethically speaking, a
pregnantwoman’sdecisionneednotbebasedonwhatisbest
for the future child; she may legitimately considers her own
and others’ interests [5]. For example, there is the perception
that an anomaly may have a traumatic or deleterious eﬀect
on the parents and the other children, as well as the future
child [24]. Here, it is important to note the diﬀerences
between expectant parents’ decisions regarding termination
of pregnancy and actual parents’ decisions regarding the
treatment of the newborn infant. The actual parents’ role
is to decide on behalf of the infant, on the basis of what
is in best interests of the infant [11]. Once delivered, the
priority is on maintaining the life and health of the infant,
aiming for the best outcomes. If the parent’s wishes are
signiﬁcantly contrary to the infant’s well-being they can
be legally overridden. In contrast, decisions regarding the
termination of the pregnancy are not ethically required to be
about the best interests of the future child. If the local laws
permit termination of the pregnancy, prospective parents
may decide for their own reasons. This may include what
they perceive would be in best interests of the future child,
but will not necessarily do so.
Specialist prenatal genetic counsellors may be particu-
larly helpful for the expectant parents in talking through
these sorts of issues, though such counselors may not
have the detailed cardiac knowledge to answer the relevant
questions. What parents need most from the paediatric
cardiologist is the best available understanding of what their
child’s life would be like, what sort of interventions would be
needed and the risks of these to the child in the local setting.
4. Intrauterine Intervention: Ethical Issues
If intrauterine interventions are available the further impor-
tant issue is the pregnant woman’s autonomy versus the
potential beneﬁcence to the fetus and future child, where the
pregnancy is going to continue and the fetus can reasonably
be regarded as a patient. In this situation, the pregnant
woman is in the ethical role of parent making decisions
for the health of her future child—but she is also making
decisions about herself and her own health. There is a
conﬂict between American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists and the American Academy of Pediatrics [25]
regarding the issue of fetal interventions. The latter accords
less weight to maternal decision making and is more tolerant
of overriding maternal refusal of intervention which may be
suggested for fetal beneﬁt. An intervention to the fetus may
pose risks to pregnant woman which she may not be willing
totake.Oneexampleisprescribingmedicationtothemother
for treating fetal arrhythmias. Another example is surgical
intervention for critical aortic or pulmonary stenosis [26–
28] which has been employed to improve fetal outcomes,
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surgical incision in pregnant woman to facilitate needling of
the ventricles.
One important question to answer is whether the poten-
tial beneﬁt to the fetus warrants the risks to the pregnant
woman. Another important question is about the risks to
the fetus: are they suﬃciently outweighed by potential gains
that it is reasonableto expect overallbeneﬁt to the fetus?One
may argue that it is reasonable to oﬀer and recommend fetal
therapyifthereisaprobabilityofsavingthelifeofthefetusor
to prevent serious or irreversible disease to fetus or child and
yet carries a low mortality/morbidity risk to the fetus/child
and low morbidity to mother [27]. But when the results of
such an intervention are questionable and not without risks
to the mother, it is not so straightforward. We suggest that in
these situations, respect for the woman’s autonomy and her
assessment of her own and her future child’s health-related
interests be given priority.
Arguably, such innovations as in utero fetal surgery need
to be conducted and evaluated as research [29], preferably
conducted in centres of excellence. In such cases, the women
need be considered as research participants. Genuine volun-
tariness and informed consent is a standard prerequisite for
any such research.
5.MultiplePregnancieswithOne Fetus with
a SeriousCardiacAnomaly: EthicalIssues
We have discussed this issue in detail in a separate paper
[30]. To summarise, dealing with the management of a twin
pregnancywhereonefetushasaseriousanomalyisoneofthe
mostchallengingandconfrontingissuesaclinicianfaces.The
management depends on the wishes, values and preferences
of the mother/parents once provided with detailed and accu-
rate information about the condition of the twins. The risk
to the unaﬀected fetus depends on chorionicity and becomes
much more problematic in monochorionic pregnancies.
Selective termination of an aﬀected twin with a serious con-
genitalheartdiseaseispossibleinsomecircumstances.Clini-
ciansneedtoprovidedetailedprobabilityoftherisksofselec-
tive termination to pregnant woman and the risks to the nor-
mal fetus, including the onset of premature labour, cerebral
hypoxiaanddeathtotheunaﬀectedtwin.Itisalsoimportant
for expectant parents to understand that fetal death of the
normal twin, especially in monochorionic twin pregnancies,
may occur even if the twin pregnancy is continued, in cir-
cumstances where the aﬀected twin becomes unwell or dies.
6. Conclusions
The basic ethical principles of respect for autonomy and
beneﬁcence play the major role in grounding physicians’
ethical responsibilities in pregnancies where there may
be a fetal cardiac anomaly. The physician’s main ethical
obligation is to provide adequate and correct information,
in a way that takes account of the extremely distressing
circumstances, so as to allow for informed decision making.
The ethical principle of autonomy creates a responsibility for
the physician to help the pregnant woman make informed
decisions based on her values and aspirations. A decision to
terminateispartlyamedicalmatter,relatingtotheprocedure
and its risks, and partly a personal moral decision bound by
legal, cultural and religious constraints. Clinicians can advise
regardingtheformer,butitisnotwithintheirrealmtoadvise
regarding the latter. The decision whether to continue or
terminateinfetalcardiacanomaliesiscomplicatedbythefact
that in the present era there are very few cardiac conditions
which are not amenable to repair and with a reasonable
future quality of life. Parents have to deal with shades of grey.
There is the additional issue of increasing fetal interventions
which may be helpful for the fetus/infant/child but may put
the mother at risk and who in turn may opt out of any
such intervention. A twin pregnancy with one aﬀected twin
further compounds the ethical considerations further. In all
situations, the overriding imperative is to provide accurate
information about the diagnosis and outcome, identify and
discuss possible options and their potential consequences for
the fetus and the pregnant woman.
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